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Human Errors as Functions of 
Language 
Patrick Tourchon 
Roman Jakobson extended the traditional communication diagram 
(which was just based on a sender, a message and an addressee) 
thanks to his studying speech abnormalities: namely, aphasia.Thus, 
the importance of context, contact and code occurred to him, 
bringing the number of relevant language functions up to six: 
referential, emotive, conative, phatic, metalingual and poetic. 
In this article, we also assume that deviant, off-standard samples 
of speech are more revealing than regular, standard ones. This leads 
us to pay attention to some more functions of language: suggestive, 
looping, and reverberating 
Introduction: Pragmatics 
The field of semiotic studies called pragmatics is a fashionable one 
nowadays, thanks to "the work of Searle, Grice [and] Clark" (Simon-
Vandenbergen, 2003). Still, earlier approaches should not be overlooked, 
for recent developments in pragmatics do not necessarily invalidate what 
its pioneers have established. 
Pragmatics as it is known today actually goes back to the work of 
Charles Sanders Peirce in the USA (Peirce, 1885-1914), though it has 
also been independently explored by Mikhail Bakhtin in Russia (Bakhtin, 
1953), Raymond Queneau in France (Queneau, 1955) and Roman 
Jakobson (Jakobson, 1959) in Czechoslovakia, to reach its full-grown 
stage thanks to Jacques Lacan in France and Dell Hymes in the USA, in 
the 1960's. 
Most of the early builders ignored each other's work. Bakhtin 
might have influenced Jakobson (Gardiner, 1992), but both were unaware 
of Peirce's groundwork; Lacan explicitly refers to Jakobson (and 
therefore, indirectly, to Bakhtin (Gardiner, 1992). But Dell Hymes 
elaborated his approach on genres and his concept of Communicative 
Competence in the 1960's, when no American translation of Bakhtin's 
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work was yet available, only to recognise, later on, the proximity of his 
approach with Bakhtin's translinguistics (Tourchon, 2001). 
What all these scholars had in common anyway was their focusing 
on genuine utterances, on language as it is actually used by native 
speakers, which includes "mistakes", "slips" of tongue {lapsus linguce), 
"misfires", that is, all sorts of errors. 
Human Errors in Utterances 
The concept of Human Error is well known in Cognitive Sciences and 
applies to many situations, from a plane crash down to a doctor pocketing 
a tuning-fork for his medical visits instead of the expected reflex hammer, 
since it always involves "the detection or recognition that the outcome 
differs from what was expected" (Hollnagel, 2002: 3). 
Yet, what is often overlooked is that all these situations (the crash 
as well as the erroneous action) also involve verbal communication, 
utterances. Semiotics, and especially pragmatics, therefore has a say in 
these areas. 
Over-spscification 
To start with an uncontroversial example, an error which is indubitably a 
semiotic mistake, let us read again the first drafts of some TESL Bachelor-
candidates' final projects. To elaborate on the theoretical rationale of 
their studies, the would-be researchers try to refer to linguists they have 
heard of. But how often do they introduce the lines they copy by a 
phrase like "Chomsky quotes: '...' "? 
Obviously, this is a lexical mistake: Chomsky only states, the student 
quotes him. But what does the mistake consist in? 
Plagiarism is not a minor issue, temporarily topical in newspapers. It 
is the major charge ever to be pronounced against an academic paper. 
On the other hand, quotation is a basic academic privilege, and in most 
countries copyright protection does not apply below a certain number of 
lines: the freedom to borrow somebody else's words is internationally 
granted, as long as the quotation remains reasonably short and full 
reference is given. 
The stress therefore is on quotations identifiable as such. The 
over-specification in the cases mentioned above is then hardly a surprise: 
"Chomsky quotes the quotation I am going to quote..." is merely a 
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(redundant) way of making the point. It is awkward only inasmuch as 
it shows a lack of self-confidence: the over-emphasis is symptomatic 
of the students' fear about his quotation being misinterpreted as 
plagiarism. 
Un-specification 
Far less straightforward, and therefore far more controversial, are human 
errors leading to a plane crash. 
In his book, Life Strategies (1999), Dr Phillip C. McGraw transcribes 
a portion of the conversation, as it is recorded on the plane black box, 
between the Captain and his First Officer, just minutes before a fatal 
crash. 
00:01:14 F.O.: (referring to the instrument showing the airport to 
the left, rather than straight ahead.) "What's wrong with 
this thing?" 
00:01:20 Capt.: "Idon'tknow, let's just continue on here and it will true 
up. Just continue." 
00:01:32 F.O.: "I've recycled this thing, still not right. Didn't we come 
our initial fix with it working?" 
(Captain does not respond.) 
(In background, sound of flight attendant giving passengers 
their final instructions before landing. She thanks them 
for flying her airline.) 
00:01:48 F.O.: "I don't get - This thing is all screwed up - says we are, 
says airport - this is not - says airport is over there. Why is 
our heading 060 degrees (northeast)? Is that messed up - is 
that not right either?" 
00:01:54 Tower: "Flight 427, you're cleared to land runway 35R, wind 
355 at ten knots. Altimeter 30.06." 
00:02:00 F.O.: "Flight 427 cleared to land - umm - cleared 33R - uhh -
35R." 
00:02:05 Capt.: "There, I have it centred up. I don't, I don't know what 
- just come left right now, come left, we go direct to airport. 
Uhh, we're cleared to land. Start, start - no, hold that. This 
just doesn't - " 
00:02:23 F.O.: "Look right. Maybe we should - " 
00:02:26 Ground proximity warning system: "Beep, beep, pull up. 
Terrain. Pull up. Terrain. Beep, beep." 
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00:02:27 Capt.: "What the - Pull up! Climb right now. Cli- " (sound of 
impact) 
(McGraw, 1999: 136-137) 
Of course, as a psychologist, Dr McGraw mainly underlines the 
denial process: none of these experienced officers is ready to 
acknowledge the fact that they are lost. So they waste a precious time 
blaming the instruments instead. 
But to a semiotician or a cognitivist, the fact that all this takes the 
form of a dialogue cannot be overlooked. Communication is also involved 
here, and its main feature is the un-specification of the core concept. 
Words referring to misdirection are removed from the utterances, which 
accounts for the blanks left here and there, when the "Captain does not 
respond", but also when the First Officer interrupts his sentences ("-
says we are, says airport - this is not -") , or when the Captain does so 
soon afterwards ("Start, start - no, hold that. This just doesn't - "). 
Of course, this can be seen as the direct effect of the denial process. 
But it is important to underline here that such a double denial (both the 
Captain and the First Officer delete words) also reveals a double 
expectation: each officer expects his colleague to first voice out the 
problem; each of them entrusts the other, and so delays the moment to 
take the blame on himself. 
In other words, individual psychology and its single denial process 
are hardly valid here: the semiotic process of a dialogic relation (Bakhtin, 
1953) takes over. An actual language is used, utterances are pronounced, 
which are distorted, not only by an individual un- or pre-conscious, but 
also by their very dialogic essence. 
Rhetoric Specification 
Still more intricate, because no actual dialogue can be recorded, is the 
individual erroneous action. This is the most controversial of human 
errors in our approach, because no language seems involved at all. No 
utterance is heard. So, how can semiotics fit? 
Dr Sigmund Freud himself confesses, in Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life (1904), having almost left his consultation room once, 
with a tuning-fork in his pocket instead of the reflex hammer he intended 
to bring. 
Again, his first emphasis is more on the mechanism of this human 
error than on its dialogic aspect: 
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For many years, a reflex hammer and a tuning-fork lay side by side on 
my desk. One day, I hurried off at the close of my office hours, as I 
wished to catch a certain train, and, despite broad daylight, put the tuning-
fork in my coat pocket in place of the reflex hammer. My attention was 
called to the mistake through the weight of the object drawing down my 
pocket. Anyone accustomed to reflect on such slight occurrences would, 
without hesitation, explain the faulty action by the hurry of the moment, 
and excuse it. In spite of that, I preferred to ask myself why I took the 
tuning-fork instead of the hammer. The haste could just as well have 
been a motive for carrying out the action properly in order not to waste 
time over the correction. 
"Who last grasped the tuning-fork?" was the question which immediately flashed 
through my mind. It happened that only a few days ago, an idiotic child, whose 
attention to sensory impressions I was testing, had been so fascinated by the 
tuning-fork that I found it difficult to tear it away from him. Could it mean, 
therefore, that I was an idiot? 
(Freud 1904:83) 
At first sight, language has nothing to do with the miscarried action: 
a similarity of attitudes (a fascination for the tuning-fork) is sufficient 
for Freud to compare himself with the idiotic child. 
Yet, his mistaken gesture can still be seen as a metaphor for a lack 
of intelligence, which, to a doctor, might translate into a mistaken 
diagnostic. A warning about the major risk in the medical profession 
thus lies behind the whole episode, telling the physician to be more 
careful through a hyperbole whereby a gross error stands as the signpost 
for far more subtle ones. Even at that stage then, language (in its rhetoric 
form, with figures of speech such as metaphor and hyperbole), is 
involved. 
Furthermore, even though it was for Lacan, to explicitly claim that 
"the symptom is itself structured like a language" (Lacan, 1953: 65), so 
that dreams, for instance, have "the structure of a sentence" (Lacan, 
1953: 63), Freud had already hinted many times to that description as 
well. For immediately after wondering whether he was as idiotic as the 
child he examined a few days before, he goes on: 
... Could it mean, therefore, that I was an idiot? To be sure, so it would seem, as 
the next thought which associated itself with the hammer was chamer (Hebrew 
for "ass"). 
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But what was the meaning of this abusive language? We must here inquire into 
the situation. I hurried to a consultation to see a patient who, according to the 
anamnesis which I received by letter, had fallen from a balcony some months 
before, and since then, had been unable to walk. The physician who invited me 
wrote that he was still unable to say whether he was dealing with a spinal injury 
or traumatic neurosis - hysteria. That was what I was to decide. This could 
therefore be a reminder to be particularly careful in this delicate differential 
diagnosis. As it is, my colleagues think that hysteria is diagnosed far too 
carelessly where more serious matters are concerned. But the abuse is not yet 
justified. Yes, the next association was that the small railroad station is the same 
place in which, some years previous, I saw a young man who, after a certain 
emotional experience, could not walk properly. At that time, I diagnosed his 
malady as hysteria, and later put him under psychic treatment; but it afterward 
turned out that my diagnosis was neither incorrect nor correct. A large number 
of the patient's symptoms were hysterical, and they promptly disappeared in 
the course of the treatment. But back of these, there was a visible remnant that 
could not be reached by therapy, and could be referred only to a multiple 
sclerosis. Those who saw the patient after me had no difficulty in recognizing 
the organic affection. 
I could scarcely have acted and judged differently; still, the impression was 
that of a serious mistake; the promise of a cure which I had given him could 
naturally not be kept. 
The mistake in grasping the tuning-fork instead of the hammer could therefore 
be translated into the following words: "You fool, you ass, get yourself together 
this time, and be careful not to diagnose again a case of hysteria where there is 
an incurable disease, as you did in this place years ago in the case of that poor 
man!" And fortunately for this little analysis, even if unfortunately for my 
mood, this same man, now showing a very spastic gait, had been to my office a 
few days before, one day after the examination of the idiotic child. 
We observe that this time it is the voice of self-criticism which makes itself 
perceptible through the mistake in grasping. The erroneously carried-out action 
is specially suited to express self-reproach. The present mistakes attempts to 
represent the mistake which was committed elsewhere. (Freud, 1904:84) 
Thus, the action as a metaphor ("a reminder"; "the voice of self-
criticism"; "to express self-reproach"; a mistake attempting "to 
represent" another mistake...) is truly understood as such by Freud 
himself. But the key point goes even further than that: not only was a 
previous mistake metaphorically represented by the present one, but 
"abusive language" was used to warn against its repetition, and the 
largest part of this short analysis is actually dedicated to interpreting, not 
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the mistake per se, but the insult "ass" as encapsulated in the pun (or 
the rhyme) "hammer / chamer", for the mistake can be "translated into 
[...] words". 
The confusion of words (hammer / chamer) through the confusion 
of things (hammer / object-of-focus-for-idiotic-children) therefore is a 
rhetoric specification of the situation (a possibly tricky medical 
consultation) and of its risks. Language and a very elaborate one at that, 
with puns, rhymes and bilingualism (the German Hammer matching the 
Hebrew chamer), is then again the core of the whole episode: "every 
unsuccessful act is a successful, not to say 'well turned', discourse" 
(Lacan, 1953: 64). 
Still, if human errors, ranging from plane crashes to everyday 
mistakes, via lexical confusions, are all connected to language, what 
functions of language are involved? 
In 1959, Roman Jakobson already described communication as a 
complex process involving six factors: not only a message, its sender 
and its addressee, but also a context, a code and a contact: 
CONTEXT 
ADDRESSER. MESSAGE. ADDRESSEE 
CONTACT 
CODE 
To each of these factors corresponds a language function: 
REFERENTIAL 
EMOTIVE. .POETIC CONATTVE 
PHATIC 
METALINGUAL 
The question is: can these functions account for the human errors 
described above? 
The Referential Function 
Like all messages, the utterances quoted above imply a context, a 
referential function. 
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The students quoting Chomsky refer to real situations of 
communication. The flying officers refer to a real place, an airport, and 
to instruments. Freud refers to an action in a specific place and time. 
The lexicon used by the students is centred on a performative verb (to 
say "I quote" is to perform the action of quoting). The conversation of 
the two flying officers is centred on the referential interpretation (where 
is the airport?) of the data they get. Freud's self-insult is centred on the 
actual risk of misdiagnosis. 
The core of all these utterances is always referential: in terms of 
content, this is what matters. Yet, each real utterance is dealing with 
much more than its context, much more than just its content. Its form is 
of paramount importance as well. 
The Emotive Function 
Also labelled as the 'expressive' function, the emotive function, centred 
on the sender, aims at allowing the locutor to express his own attitude 
toward his topic. This would account for the somewhat critical attitude 
of the flying officers towards their own initial assumptions, when they 
grow restless about their first (dismissive) reading of the compass. It 
would account as well for Freud's self-criticism in the whole episode of 
his erroneous act. Still, the exact degree of specification (over-, un-
specification, or rhetoric specification) shaping each utterance is not 
properly addressed. The students, flying officers and doctors, all show a 
critical attitude, and yet, they specify their utterances in three incompatible 
ways. 
Conative and Phatic Functions 
Neither have their various degrees of specification anything to do with 
the conative and phatic functions. In fact, these two functions are 
noticeably absent here. Even while discussing the situation, the two flying 
officers never use the conative function. They never actually call or 
instruct their addressee. In the same way, they all let the 'contact' take 
care of itself. While struggling with the meaning of their data, they assume 
that the communication will go on. They utterly neglect the phatic function. 
Flying officers as well as students and doctors in the cases mentioned 
above are instead concerned with their encyclopaedias, and are therefore 
more likely to give priority to the poetic and metalingual functions. 
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The Metalingual Function 
All the examples given by Roman Jakobson to illustrate the metalingual 
function are questions about meaning (T don't understand'; 'what do 
you mean?'). This function then mainly revolves around the lexicon. 
True enough, the use of the verb to quote is regulated by English 
dictionaries, but the students' dealing with this lexical problem take an 
overemphasising form. They do not define the verb, they do not explain 
it or elaborate on it. On the contrary, they misuse it by enforcing it upon 
the addressee for fear of miscommunication. 
In other words, far from clarifying the content of the message, the 
locutors here acknowledge a gap in the communication process and try 
to bridge it. 
In such cases, communication follows this sort of route: 
ADDRESSER MESSAGE /gap/ INTERPRETANT..... ADDRESSEE 
IDIOLECT 1 IDIOLECT 2 
Conversely, the meaning of the data the two flying officers get is 
blurred to the point of illegibility. Somehow the message is not conveyed, 
so that the addressee is left with a huge interpretative problem. It is for 
each officer to assess the situation in spite of his colleague's denial. 
The metalingual function this time is utterly missing, for no proper lexicon 
is used. Instead, shared encyclopaedias are supposed to take over and fill 
in the blanks, in a communication process that looks like this: 
ADDRESSER [MESSAGE???] ADDRESSEE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA 2 
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The Poetic Function 
The choice of a figure of speech, like a rhyme, a metaphor or a hyperbole, 
is yet more typical of the poetic function. Freud's preconscious pun on 
Hammer/chamer is therefore fully anticipated by Jakobson's diagram. 
By characterising his attitude as "donkey-like", Freud indeed makes 
use of a "principle of equivalence" between the epitome of the medical 
profession, the (reflex) hammer, and the epitome of stupid behaviour, a 
donkey, an ass {chamer). Furthermore, he "projects th[is] principle of 
equivalence form the axis of selection to the axis of combination" 
(Jakobson 1959:71), since he constructs his whole utterance on a phonetic 
proximity. 
And yet, since the utterance "who gets a hammer is a chamer" 
competes with another "translation" of Freud's erroneous action (given 
by the psychoanalyst himself as "could it mean, therefore, that I was an 
idiot?"), the poetic function is present/absent in the message, as if several 
routes were open, depending on whether the rhyme Hammer/chamer is 
used or not: 
<MESSAGE a \ * J > ADDRESSEE 
MESSAGE co ' 
At any rate, Jakobson's functions here seem insufficient, because 
none of them ever refer to the gap or to the competing messages the 
actual utterances quoted above reveal. When it comes to Human Errors, 
some more functions are obviously needed. 
The Looping Function 
Freud's aim, as his own addressee, is to "translate" his erroneous action 
into a language he can understand. So, he tries hard to specify his own 
attitude. The trouble is that MESSAGE a (rather referential since it 
elaborates on a similarity of behaviours in front of the same object, a 
tuning-fork) sounds mechanistic to him, while MESSAGE CO (more 
rhetoric with its use of rhymes) sounds off-beat: after all, if the Hammer 
had really been taken, Freud would not have looked like a chamer, it is 
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only because he took a tuning-fork instead, that he looks stupid, but then 
the pun is not between Diapason and chamerl 
The two messages are thus incompatible and defective in different 
ways. Freud then hits the ^ in the diagram above, and uses the looping 
function, a to and fro movement between MESSAGE a and MESSAGE 
to, to eventually convey the idea. 
Suggestive Function 
Conversely, the flying officers do not convey the correct idea at all, or 
at least, not until it is too late. Far from sending redundant messages to 
make sure the point is taken, they entrust too much their partner with 
interpreting abilities. They keep removing words from their utterances, 
expecting the blanks to say what they mean. Using a suggestive 
function, they shunt the message, which is hardly delivered at all, to 
pass through their respective encyclopaedias, hoping that 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 1 and ENCYCLOPEDIA 2 intersect somewhere 
in an ENCYCLOPEDIA ln2 . 
The Reverb Function 
The locutors who keep focusing on the gap between the encyclopaedias, 
or between idiolects, will tend to worry about their addressee's 
interpretant. They do not rely much on the code in itself, but, unable to 
use IDIOLECT 2, which belongs to their addressees exclusively, and 
unsure about the intelligibility of their own IDIOLECT 1, they let their 
words reverberate the meaning, letting the important signified 
contaminate all the signifiers: the signified "quotation" undermines the 
verb to state so much that the signifier [stelt] is read [kwot], or/state/ is 
spelled /quote/. 
Conclusion 
The last three functions, looping, suggestive and reverberating are 
new in the sense that they never appeared in Jakobson's communication 
diagram. Yet, they are indispensable to fully account for some Human 
Errors. 
One reason why these functions have never been isolated so far 
partly lies in the fact that some Human Errors are not commonly regarded 
as involving language at all. 
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Another probable cause for the three functions described here to 
have been overlooked is that they become identifiable only if some 
instances of Jakobson's communication diagram are split: the code has 
to be split into idiolects to reveal a gap; the message has to be split 
between its a (basic form) and its w (rhetoric form) to show that the 
process of selection as such (#) sometimes directly interferes with the 
actual utterance; and finally, the encyclopaedias have to be pinpointed 
within what is usually labelled as the "context" to map the route of a 
meaning that is expected to be conveyed even though no clear message 
is ever delivered. 
Still, it would be an overstatement to assert that "Jakobson's six 
functions [...] are no longer a valid framework for current work in the 
study of language"(Simon-Vandenbergen, 2003). 
Jakobson has shown how to elaborate on the basic communication 
diagram 
(ADDRESSER MESSAGE. ADDRESSEE) 
after his attention was drawn to the problems it poses by his studying 
aphasia. 
Now, it is only by following the method he initiated, by paying attention, 
as he did, to non-standard utterances, that some further details can be 
added to his own six-function initial diagram 
(ADDRESSER MESSAGE ADDRESSEE 
CONTEXT 
CONTACT 
CODE). 
A genuine utterance, with all the approximations (forcing the locutor 
to focus on the selection (^) process [see looping function]), the 
reluctance (forcing the locutor to rely on the common encyclopaedic 
area ( n ) [see suggestive function]) and the emphases (forcing the locutor 
to focus on the /gap/ [see reverberating function]) it implies, follows a 
route which is not that straight: 
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MESSAGE a 
ADDRESSER * \ / g a p / INTERPRETANT ADDRESSEE 
X
x MESSAGE c o / ! 
: I 
IDIOLECT 1 IDIOLECT 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 1 ~ -CODE- ENCYCLOPEDIA 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA ln2 
I E N C Y C L O P E D I A 3 ! 
L C O N T E X T j 
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